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**OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

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State Dept. review completed

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1. CZECH PREMIER ASKS FOR STATE INVITATION TO PARIS

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Czech premier Siroky and foreign minister David have asked for an invitation for a state visit to Paris some time before 14 July. According to the French ambas-

sador in Prague, his government has informed the Czechs that it has no objection in principle to such a visit in the fall if conversations are limited strictly to Franco-Czech matters and are preceded by an "adjustment" of relations through diplomatic channels. During such preliminary conversations, the French would seek the reopening of the French Institute in Prague and their consulate in Bratislava and a resumption of French information activities in general.

The French ambassador views the Czech request as an attempt to establish a common front with France on the German question and as an effort to demonstrate that Czech foreign policy is to some degree independent.

Comment

The French Foreign Ministry, hopeful of renewing its traditional contacts with the East European countries, considers Czechoslovakia the most feasible place to make "a dent in the iron curtain."

The Czech regime may be willing to grant the French such concessions as the reopening of the Bratislava consulate and an expansion of cultural contacts in return for the invitation.

The Polish premier's request for a visit to Paris has already been granted by France. These Satellite moves are part of the Soviet bloc's effort to weaken French support of Western policies and exploit French apprehensions over West German rearmament.

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3. ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER MARTINO MAY BE REPLACED

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Italian president Gronchi may make an effort following the 27-28 May local elections to have Foreign Minister Martino replaced by Defense Minister Taviani,

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Comment

Martino is a member of the committee of three foreign ministers chosen at the North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting in May to examine ways of extending NATO co-operation in nonmilitary fields. He has been mentioned frequently as a probable casualty in the cabinet reshuffle which is expected to take place early this summer. He is a member of the small Liberal Party and does not have strong support among the Christian Democrats.

The appointment of Taviani, who is prominent in the Christian Democratic party, probably would not change the Italian government's foreign policy.

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4. UNREST IN HAITI

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The government of Haiti has declared a state of siege in the capital and two other cities as a result of an outbreak of student strikes and demonstrations, according to the American embassy in Port-au-Prince. Rumors that high gov-

ernment officials and army officers have been working with opposition elements have led to speculation over cabinet changes and an army shake-up.

The opposition may have incited the disturbances in order to create an atmosphere of unrest in an effort to force President Magloire to resign. Through a novel interpretation of the constitution, opposition elements contend that the president's term, instead of extending to 15 May 1957, legally expired on 15 May of this year. The contention has given a premature start to the campaign for presidential elections set for next April and is producing a period of increasing political activity and unrest.

The regime apparently has little public support and some observers feel that "this is the beginning of the end for the Magloire administration." Although General Magloire's popularity has steadily declined, he apparently has managed through direct control to maintain the support of the majority of the armed forces which helped to bring him to power in 1950.

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